Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain

Hongmei Guo, Shuiliang Gu and Yingsheng Su

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2018, vol. 2018, 1-9

Abstract:

A supply chain contract is established using a dynamic, Nash bargaining game which determines the optimal bargaining power allocation for the manufacturer, retailer, and society in an environment affected by moral hazard and irreversible investment. The results found that the manufacturer’s choice was to hold all bargaining power; however, due to the remaining information problem, the retailer still had a profit; in contrast, the retailer was only willing to give up bargaining power if the manufacturer’s profit was reserved. The optimal bargaining power allocation was found to be strongly related to the ability to convert and monitor technology, with the bargaining power gradually shifting to the manufacturer as the technology improved. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2018/2068287.pdf (application/pdf)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2018/2068287.xml (text/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:2068287

DOI: 10.1155/2018/2068287

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society from Hindawi
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohamed Abdelhakeem ().