Complexity Analysis of a Cournot-Bertrand Duopoly Game Model with Limited Information

Hongwu Wang and Junhai Ma

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2013, vol. 2013, 1-6

Abstract:

A Cournot-Bertrand mixed duopoly game model with limited information about the market and opponent is considered, where the market has linear demand and two firms have the same fixed marginal cost. The principles of decision-making are bounded rational. One firm chooses output and the other chooses price as decision variable, with the assumption that there is a certain degree of differentiation between the products offered by firms to avoid the whole market being occupied by the one that applies a lower price. The existence of Nash equilibrium point and its local stability of the game are investigated. The complex dynamics, such as bifurcation scenarios and route to chaos, are displayed using parameter basin plots by numerical experiment. The influences of the parameters on the system performance are discussed from the perspective of economics.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2013/287371.pdf (application/pdf)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2013/287371.xml (text/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:287371

DOI: 10.1155/2013/287371

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society from Hindawi
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohamed Abdelhakeem ().