A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games

Lei Wang, Cui Liu, Juan Xue and Hongwei Gao

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2018, vol. 2018, 1-6

Abstract:

The problem of strategic stability of cooperative solutions for multistage games is studied. The sufficient conditions related to discount factors are presented, which guarantee the existence of Nash or strong Nash equilibria in such games and therefore guarantee the strategic stability of cooperative solutions. The deviating payoffs of players are given directly, which are related closely to these conditions and avoid the loss of super-additivity of a class of general characteristic functions. As an illustration, Nash and strong Nash equilibria are found for the repeated infinite stage Prisoner’s dilemma game.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2018/3293745.pdf (application/pdf)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/DDNS/2018/3293745.xml (text/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:3293745

DOI: 10.1155/2018/3293745

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society from Hindawi
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohamed Abdelhakeem ().