Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary Games

Orlando Gomes

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2012, vol. 2012, 1-23

Abstract:

This paper furnishes a guide for the study of 2-dimensional evolutionary games in discrete time. Evolutionarily stable strategies are identified and nonlinear outcomes are explored. Besides the baseline payoffs of the established strategic interaction, the following elements are also vital to determine the dynamic outcome of a game: the initial fitness of each agent and the rule of motion that describes how individuals switch between strategies. In addition to the dynamic rule commonly used in evolutionary games, the replicator dynamics, we propose another rule, which acknowledges the role of expectations and sophisticates the replicator mechanism.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:416789

DOI: 10.1155/2012/416789

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