The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System

Feng Cao, Ling Zhang, Yihan Wu and Juan L. G. Guirao

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2022, vol. 2022, 1-13

Abstract: Although the ability to manage public health emergencies in China has improved significantly, there are still many challenges to the existing information transmission mechanism in pandemic early warning systems. In this context, a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the local government, the whistleblower, and the public is formulated. By using Matlab, the dynamic evolution path of the game model is stimulated under different conditions. Stable strategies for an early warning system for public health emergencies are also explored. The results indicate that the cost of whistleblowing, the cost of response, and the benefit of attention significantly influence strategic decisions among three parties. This study highlights the importance of whistleblowing in managing public health emergencies. Yet, our findings provide theoretical support for policy recommendations for promoting public health emergency preparedness.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:5796428

DOI: 10.1155/2022/5796428

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