Equilibrium Joining Strategies of Delay-Sensitive Customers in a Queueing System with Service Quality Feedback

Peng Liu, Jun Lv, Tao Jiang and Xudong Chai

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-11

Abstract:

In some queueing systems, customers are frequently asked for giving a service quality feedback for their service at their service completion instants. Based on this phenomenon, in this paper, we model this type of queueing systems as clearing queues with service quality feedback and system maintenance. Once the system receives an unsatisfied (negative) feedback from customers (i.e., a customer is unsatisfied with the service), the system undergoes an adjustment procedure, and at the same time, all the present customers are forced to leave the system. By considering the waiting cost and reward, we discuss the joining behavior of customers and, respectively, derive the corresponding equilibrium joining strategies and social optimal strategies under different levels of information (the observable and the unobservable cases). Finally, some numerical examples are provided to show the effect of several system parameters on the equilibrium and optimal balking strategies.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:5906407

DOI: 10.1155/2020/5906407

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