Coordination of New Energy Vehicles Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Government Subsidies and Different Power Structures

Yuping Wu, Zhaoyang Tian, Guilin Chang and Chun Wei

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2022, vol. 2022, 1-16

Abstract: With the gradual retirement of the first batch of new energy vehicles in recent years, determining the optimal recycling mode has become an urgent concern. Considering the closed-loop supply chain, the government subsidy system, and different market power structures, this paper studies new energy vehicle recycling decisions and supply chain contract coordination. The results show that given an increase in government subsidies, the profit of the dominant agent in the closed-loop supply chain will be higher than that of the follower, and an increase in wholesale and recovery prices may lead to an increase in sales prices. In addition, the effect of government subsidies on battery recovery is better in cases of vehicle manufacturer dominance than in those of battery manufacturer dominance. Finally, when a battery manufacturer is in the dominant position, a revenue sharing contract can incentivize supply chain coordination; when a vehicle manufacturer is in the dominant position, a two-part tariff contract can realize coordination in the supply chain.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:7561841

DOI: 10.1155/2022/7561841

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