The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity

Yu Yu and Jia-Qian Xu

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-11

Abstract:

In this paper, a dynamic rent-seeking game incorporating policymaker cost and competition intensity is considered. On the basis of the political environment and rent-seekers with incomplete information set, the locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is proved. The competition intensity and policymaker cost could enlarge the stability region of Nash equilibrium. The higher the competition intensity is, the more the opponent’s expenditure reduces the player’s success probability, which is beneficial to the maintenance of Nash equilibrium. The higher the policymaker cost is, the less easily both players succeed and the more stable the rent-seeking market is. As the competition parameter decreases or the expenditure parameter increases, there will be chaos in a rent-seeking market. Chaos control is in order to stabilize the equilibrium of the rent-seeking game.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnddns:8081370

DOI: 10.1155/2020/8081370

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