Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of the Generalized First-Price Auction

Xiaohu Han and Shulin Liu

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2015, vol. 2015, 1-9

Abstract:

We analyze the generalized first-price auction under incomplete information setting. Without setting a reserve price, the efficient symmetrical Bayes-Nash equilibrium is characterized and found to be increasing as the number of bidders is sufficiently large. Then, the explicit expression for the expected revenue of the search engine is found and the effect of the click rates of all the positions on the expected revenue is obtained. Finally, with setting of the reserve price, we have found the optimal reserve price and examine how the difference of the search engine’s revenues with setting reserve price and without setting reserve price varies with the reserve price.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/MPE/2015/301734.pdf (application/pdf)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/MPE/2015/301734.xml (text/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:301734

DOI: 10.1155/2015/301734

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Mathematical Problems in Engineering from Hindawi
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohamed Abdelhakeem ().