The Effects of Open Innovation Platform Knowledge Strategies on Participants: Evolutionary Game Research

Mo Zhang, Chaoran Lin, Jun Guan and Yan Lin

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-12

Abstract:

Based on previous research on open innovation and appropriability strategies, using knowledge production functions and evolutionary game methods, this paper describes the process of dynamic cooperation between open innovation platforms and their participants. This paper specifically analyzes the influence of open innovation platform’s knowledge appropriability/knowledge sharing strategies, as well as participants’ exit/nonexit strategy, on the cooperative relationship. Through simulation analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the knowledge appropriability strategy of the open innovation platform and the participant’s nonexit strategy is an important strategic point of the cooperation between open innovation platforms and participants; second, the amount of knowledge production affects the strategic choices of open innovation platforms, while the knowledge increment affects the strategic choices of participants; third, the appreciation coefficient of complementary assets determines the direction of evolution of the cooperation process.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:4012713

DOI: 10.1155/2020/4012713

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