Procedural Implementation and Axiomatization of the Weighted Nonseparable Cost Value

Hui Yang, Wenna Wang and Zhengsheng Ding

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-8

Abstract:

The paper defines a new value called the weighted nonseparable cost value (weighted-NSC value), which divides the nonseparable cost on the ground of an exogenous attached weight and compromises egalitarianism and utilitarianism of a value flexibly. First, we construct an optimization model to minimize the deweighted variance of complaint and define its optimal solution to be the weighted-NSC value. Second, a process is set up to acquire the weighted-NSC value, which enlarges the traditional procedural values. In the process, one player’s marginal contribution is divided up by all participants rather than merely restricted within his precursors. Lastly, adopting the weight in defining a value destructs the classical symmetry. This promotes the definition of - symmetry for the grand-marginal normalized game to defend against the effect of weight and axiomatically sculptures the weighted-NSC value. Dual dummifying player property is also applied to characterize the new defined value.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/MPE/2020/4674279.pdf (application/pdf)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/MPE/2020/4674279.xml (text/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:4674279

DOI: 10.1155/2020/4674279

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Mathematical Problems in Engineering from Hindawi
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohamed Abdelhakeem ().