The Study of a Mathematical Model in Information Acquisition and Disclosure

Ce Huang

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2015, vol. 2015, 1-8

Abstract:

A mathematical model involving a decision maker and an expert is investigated. Through analyzing the model, we obtain several results on the expert’s information acquisition and disclosure strategy. When withholding information is costly to the expert, in equilibrium, an expert with a higher withholding cost acquires less information but discloses more acquired information. We also examine which expert is optimal to the decision maker among a group of experts with different costs of withholding information.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:491328

DOI: 10.1155/2015/491328

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