Equilibrium and Optimal Strategies in M/M/1 Queues with Working Vacations and Vacation Interruptions

Ruiling Tian, Linmin Hu and Xijun Wu

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2016, vol. 2016, 1-10

Abstract:

We consider the customers equilibrium and socially optimal joining-balking behavior in single-server Markovian queues with multiple working vacations and vacation interruptions. Arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a linear reward-cost structure that incorporates their desire for service, as well as their unwillingness for waiting. We consider that the system states are observable, partially observable, and unobservable, respectively. For these cases, we first analyze the stationary behavior of the system and get the equilibrium strategies of the customers and compare them to socially optimal balking strategies numerically.

Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:9746962

DOI: 10.1155/2016/9746962

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