Optimal Service Commission Contract Design of OTA to Create O2O Model by Cooperation with TTA under Asymmetric Information

Pingping Shi, Yaogang Hu and Yongfeng Wang

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2021, vol. 2021, 1-17

Abstract:

This paper studies the service commission contract of an online travel agency (OTA) to integrate the online to offline (O2O) model by cooperation with a traditional travel agency (TTA) under asymmetric information. The principal-agent models are established with symmetric and asymmetric service information, respectively. Further, the impacts of asymmetry information on the revenue of the OTA, TTA, and the whole O2O model and the properties of optimal commission contract are analyzed. The paper notes management implications: (1) OTA designs service commission contracts by weighing the fixed payment and service commission coefficient for different incentives to TTAs with different serviceabilities and (2) because the existence of asymmetric information always leads to the damage of OTA’s expected revenue, OTA should encourage the TTA to disclose private service information.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:9934726

DOI: 10.1155/2021/9934726

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