International Negotiations on Climate Change: A Non-cooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol

Akira Okada and 章 岡田

No 2004-02, Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

Keywords: asymmetric Nash bargaining solution; CO2 emissions trading; international negotiations; Kyoto Protocol; non-cooperative bargaining games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2004-08
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Working Paper: International Negotiations on Climate Change: A Non-cooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol (2004)
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