Multiplicity and Sensitivity of Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games

Toshimasa Maruta, 利昌 丸田, Akira Okada and 章 岡田

No 2007-06, Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

Keywords: Equilibrium selection; stochastic stability; unanimity game; coordination game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2007-06
Note: June 13, 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:econdp:2007-06

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