Non‐Discrimination and the Pareto Principle

Yongsheng Xu

Economic Review, 2000, vol. 51, issue 1, 54-60

Abstract: This paper proposes and examines the notion of non-discrimination in an Arrow-Sen social choice framework. A minimal requirement for non-discrimination is that there are at least two individuals, each with a pair of social states, such that the society should treat them symmetrically so long as the two individuals are symmetric and have symmetric preferences over their respective pairs. It is then shown that this minimal requirement is in conflict with the weak Pareto principle if all logically possible individual preferences are allowed.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:ecorev:v:51:y:2000:i:1:p:54-60

DOI: 10.15057/21409

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