Asymmetric Information Bubbles: Survey

Yasushi Asako

Economic Review, 2020, vol. 71, issue 1, 49-62

Abstract: This article reviews past game-theoretical and experimental studies on economic bubbles. The first part of this article introduces several important game-theoretical analyses such as the riding-bubble model,which postulates that asymmetric information is an important cause of the emergence of bubbles. The second part mainly reviews past experimental studies. Although the majority of early studies show that bubbles can emerge as a disequilibrium phenomenon, recent studies show that bubbles can also arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. This article concludes that it is important to compare and understand “equilibrium bubbles” and “disequilibrium bubbles” in detail.

JEL-codes: C72 D82 G12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:ecorev:v:71:y:2020:i:1:p:49-62

DOI: 10.15057/30959

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