予想に働きかける政策をゲーム理論で考える, Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy to Work on Expectations: Game Theoretic Considerations

貴志 宇井 and Takashi Ui

Economic Review, 2023, vol. 74, issue 1-2, 6-6

Abstract: 2013 年以来，日本銀行は人々のインフレ予想に働きかけて2％のインフレ率を実現しようとしてきたが，予想への働きかけは失敗した．本稿ではゲーム理論の視点から「なぜインフレ予想の操作は難しいのか」という問題について考える．予想インフレ率が長期間安定しているとき，その予想インフレ率は共有知識となり，分析哲学者デイヴィッド・ルイスの意味での慣習として定着する．このときインフレ予想を操作するには，一人ひとりのインフレ予想だけでなく，その共有知識の操作が必要になる．共有知識の操作に成功した例として，1994 年にブラジルで実施されたレアル計画について検討する．また，共有知識の操作とナラティブ経済学の関係について論じる．, From 2013 to 2022, the Bank of Japan tried and failed to achieve a two percent inflation target by influencing people’s inflation expectations. This study examines the difficulty in manipulating inflation expectations from a game theory perspective. When the expected rate of inflation is stable over a long period, it becomes common knowledge, and thus, a convention in David Lewis’s sense. Manipulating inflation expectations requires the manipulation of common knowledge, for which certain devices are necessary. As an example of successful common knowledge manipulation, we consider the Real Plan implemented in Brazil in 1994 and discuss its connection to narrative economics because one way to manipulate common knowledge is to create a narrative.

JEL-codes: C72 D80 E31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
Note: 【研究ノート】
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