When Does Terrorism Occur: Game-Theoretic Analysis and Offense-Defense Balance

Jin Yeub Kim

Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 2021, vol. 62, issue 2, 59-73

Abstract: Offense-defense theory argues that wars are more likely in offense-dominant periods. I study how this claim can be challenged when it comes to making predictions about terrorism. To do so, I consider a model of continuous-time conflict between a status quo state and a terrorist, who develops offensive military technology and has private information on its aggressiveness. I characterize two measures of offense-defense balance, and show that a greater offense advantage in the balance is not associated with a higher risk of terrorism. This paper supports the critics of offense-defense theory, and provides insights into understanding when terrorism occurs.

Keywords: terrorism; game theory; offense-defense balance; military technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 D82 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hitjec:v:62:y:2021:i:2:p:59-73

DOI: 10.15057/hje.2021003

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