Incentive Monopoly Regulation with Entry

Jaehong Kim

No a399, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper analyzes the non-dichotomy nature of the entry and the price regulations under asymmetric information. When current market is a monopoly and there is a potential entrant, the government should make decisions both on the monopoly (price) regulation and on the entry regulation simultaneously. In this case, if information is incomplete, entry and price regulations should be incentive compatible not only individually but also jointly against each other. An integrated incentive regulation which incorporates entry and price regulations at the same time is derived for the comprehensive analysis of the monopoly regulation under asymmetric information.

Keywords: asymmetric information; price regulation; entry regulation; incentive compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2000-11
Note: Bibliography: p. 17
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:a399

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