Early commitments help patent pool formation
Yann M?ni?re and
Fran?ois L?v?que
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Yann Ménière ()
No 384, PIE/CIS Discussion Paper from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Abstract:
This paper explores in what circumstances patent owners can be expected to join unilaterally a patent pool. We develop a simple model in which owners of patents reading on a standard grant licences to competing manufacturers. Manufacturers must sink a fixed cost to enter the market for standard compliant products, and are thus exposed to a hold up when royalties are set after their entry. We show that the formation of non-cooperative patent pools nearly always fails if it takes place once manufacturers have incurred fixed costs - as is usually the case. By contrast, allowing the formation of patent pools ex ante facilitates the emergence of stable non-cooperative patent pools. Such ex ante pools yield lower prices and higher licensing profits than ex post patent pools would. We discuss the policy implications of these results concerning the credibilty of licensing commitments required by standard setting bodies.
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2008-07
Note: June 17, 2008
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/15852/pie_dp384.pdf
Related works:
Journal Article: Patent pool formation: Timing matters (2011) 
Working Paper: Early commitments help patent pool formation (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:piecis:384
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