BANK ACQUISITIONS AND LOAN OFFICER AUTHORITY: EVIDENCE FROM FRENCH BANKS

Ghassen Bouslama and Christophe Bouteiller

The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 2016, vol. 10, issue 1, 68-84

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to study how the delegation of decision-making rights towards Small and medium-sized enterprises loan officers evolves as a result of bank mergers and acquisitions. Using the framework of organizational architecture theory as our starting point, we examine here one of its three components: the decentralization of decision-making rights. Our survey of Small and medium-sized enterprises loan officers in two recently acquired French banks shows that these officers are often allowed to use their initiative. However, bank consolidation operations do not increase the decentralization of authorization rights. We even observe in such circumstances an increase in hierarchical control. Ultimately, we cannot conclude that in consolidated banks small and medium-sized enterprises loan officers enjoy greater autonomy.

Keywords: Bank Mergers and Acquisitions; Decentralization of Decision-Making Rights; Theory of Organizational Architecture; Soft Information; Bank-SME Relation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibf:ijbfre:v:10:y:2016:i:1:p:68-84

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