The Impact of Governance Mechanism of Financial Listed Companies on the Pay and the Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Executives

Sen Wang and Feng Liu

International Journal of Business and Management, 2018, vol. 13, issue 3, 233

Abstract: The corporate governance mechanism is very important to solve the principal-agent problem effectively. Based on the particularity of the financial industry, this paper uses the panel data of 45 listed companies in China's financial industry from 2007 to 2015, the empirical results show that the degree of ownership concentration, the duality of CEO and chairman of the board and the independent directors proportion have a significant negative impact on executive pay, and the size of the board of supervisors has no marked impact on executive pay. The degree of ownership concentration has a significant positive impact on the pay-performance sensitivity, and the duality of CEO and chairman of the board, the independent directors proportion and the size of the board of supervisors have a significant negative impact on the pay-performance sensitivity. For the listed companies in the financial sector, they should pay attention to the executive pay disclosure system, the board of supervisors governance mechanism and the independent director system. We can use the degree of ownership concentration to improve the pay-performance sensitivity, and make corporate governance more effective.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibn:ijbmjn:v:13:y:2018:i:3:p:233

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