The Politics of Public Goods Provision under Asymmetric Decentralization

Ignacio Lago and André Blais

No WP2601, IDEAGOV Working Papers from IDEAGOV - International Center for Decentralization and Governance

Abstract: This paper examines how asymmetric regional decentralization affects the politics of public goods provision. Using survey data from Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Spain, as well as panel data from 709 legislative elections in 73 democracies between 1960 and 2018, the study analyzes how centralized, symmetric, and asymmetric territorial arrangements influence electoral accountability and party nationalization. The authors find that asymmetric decentralization decreases electoral accountability in national elections but increases it in regional elections, and that it contributes to greater territorial heterogeneity in partisan support.

Keywords: Accountability; asymmetric decentralization; economic voting; nationalization; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H70 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2026-01-14
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