An economic perspective on asymmetric federalism in Canada: the case of Québec

François Vaillancourt

No WP2603, IDEAGOV Working Papers from IDEAGOV - International Center for Decentralization and Governance

Abstract: This paper presents the various and unique policy choices made by Québec since WWII and examines their impacts within the context of asymmetric federalism in Canada. Québec is arguably one of the most autonomous subnational governments in industrialised countries. The paper analyses the constitutional and legal framework underlying asymmetry, key manifestations of Québec’s differentiated policies, and the consequences of these arrangements. The findings suggest that asymmetry has strengthened Québec’s francophone identity and contributed to a larger public sector and more equal income distribution relative to Ontario, but provides no evidence of superior economic growth. Asymmetry does not result in greater federal transfers to Québec. For Canada, asymmetric federalism may have reduced secessionist pressures while enabling policy experimentation.

Keywords: Asymmetry; Canada; federalism; Québec; language policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H70 H77 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2026-01-27
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.ideagov.eu/RePEc/ida/wpaper/WP2603.pdf First version, 2026 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ida:wpaper:wp2603

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IDEAGOV Working Papers from IDEAGOV - International Center for Decentralization and Governance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by IDEAGOV - International Center for Decentralization and Governance ().