Perceptions of Corruption and Preferences for Redistributive Policies: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Latin America

Matías Busso, Julián Messina and Juliana Quigua

No 14661, IDB Publications (Working Papers) from Inter-American Development Bank

Abstract: This study examines whether information about corruption and tax evasion changes perceived unfairness in the income distribution, perceived inequality of opportunity, and support for specific redistributive policies. Using a survey experiment administered in eight Latin American countries, we find that factual information about public corruption and elite tax evasion increases perceptions of unfairness and unequal opportunity. It also increases support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households. However, these effects do not extend to broader tax-financed redistribution: respondents do not become more supportive of raising corporate taxes, broadening the personal income tax, or increasing the VAT to finance social spending, nor do they become more supportive of expanding conditional cash transfers or non-contributory pensions through higher taxes. The results are consistent with trust limiting the translation of inequality concerns into support for broader tax-financed redistribution: the treatments increased perceived elite influence over government policy and reduced some measures of trust in public officials and firms.

JEL-codes: D31 D73 H21 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:brikps:14661

DOI: 10.18235/0014410

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