Chasing Patents

Flavio Menzies and Rohan Pitchford

International and Development Economics Working Papers from International and Development Economics

Abstract: We examine the problem faced by a company that wishes to purchase patents in the hands of two di¤erent patent owners. Complementarity of these patents in the production process of the company is a prime e¢ciency reason for them being owned (or licenced) by the company. We show that this very same complementarity can lead to patent owners behaving strategically in bargaining, and delaying their sale to the company. When the company is highly leveraged, such ine¢cient delay is limited. Comparative statics results are also obtained.

JEL-codes: L59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2002
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