Does Collecting Taxes Erode the Accountability of Informal Leaders? Evidence from the DRC

Augustin Bergeron, Elie Kabue Ngindu, Gabriel Tourek and Jonathan L. Weige

No 18379, Working Papers from Institute of Development Studies, International Centre for Tax and Development

Date: 2024
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