 How debt maturity reacts to the interactions of internal corporate governance mechanismsHanan Alhussayen, Ridha Shabou and Imed Medhioub Afro-Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting, 2021, vol. 11, issue 5, 691-717 Abstract: As the two primary internal corporate governance mechanisms, boards of directors and ownership structures are important for disciplining managers through short-term and long-term debt and, thus, debt maturity. The interactions between these mechanisms tend to define which type of debt is the more effective discipline mechanism. Thus, this study aims to define the impacts of interactions between intensive board monitoring and ownership structures on debt maturity for all non-financial firms listed on the Saudi market from 2008 to 2013. The results reveal that board monitoring intensity encourages Saudi listed firms to apply more long-term debt. Both direct ownership by large shareholders and family-held firms as controlling shareholders strengthen the monitoring functions of the board and encourage Saudi listed firms to apply more long-term debt. In contrast, ultimate owners, who hold indirect ownership of firms, tend to distract the board from applying its monitoring functions effectively. Keywords: intensive board monitoring; IBM; direct ownership; indirect ownership; family ownership; debt maturity; long-term debt; short-term debt. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:afasfa:v:11:y:2021:i:5:p:691-717 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Afro-Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd |
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