Director categorisation and monitoring efficiency

Samira Abi Dames, Bilal Al-Dah and Mustafa Dah

International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 2023, vol. 17, issue 3, 310-329

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of director co-option on the relationship between board structure and firm monitoring. Though non-co-opted independent directors enhance internal monitoring, co-opted independent directors seem to be the worst monitors. We do not observe a substantial difference in the monitoring functionality of co-opted and non-co-opted inside board members. Our paper suggests that co-opted independent directors are the main driving factor behind the converse association between co-opted boards and internal monitoring. We conclude that the efficiency of board monitoring should not be analysed solely based on director classification or director co-option, but rather a combination of both.

Keywords: director co-option; board structure; monitoring efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijbget:v:17:y:2023:i:3:p:310-329

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