 A comparative analysis of greening policies and CSR efforts in a government-led sustainable supply chain across different channel powersChirantan Mondal and Bibhas C. Giri International Journal of Business and Globalisation, 2025, vol. 39, issue 2, 200-225 Abstract: This article considers a government-led sustainable supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under selling price, greening level and CSR effort dependent market demand. The manufacturer and the retailer are responsible for product greening and CSR, respectively. To stimulate product greening and CSR effort, the government subsidises both of them. The optimal decisions are obtained both analytically and numerically under four game-theoretic policies viz. centralised policy (model C), manufacturer-led decentralised policy (model M), retailer-led decentralised policy (model R) and Nash game (model N). Three special cases are examined by considering that the manufacturer does not produce green products, the retailer does not give any effort in CSR, and both of them do not provide any effort. Our results show that model N provides comparatively better outcome, and each member prefers to lead the channel as it helps to gain higher profit. Keywords: sustainable supply chain; greening level; corporate social responsibility; CSR; government subsidy; game theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijbglo:v:39:y:2025:i:2:p:200-225 Access Statistics for this article More articles in International Journal of Business and Globalisation from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.