The efficiency of greedy best response algorithm in road traffic assignment

Lahna Idres and Mohammed Said Radjef

International Journal of Mathematics in Operational Research, 2019, vol. 15, issue 3, 338-363

Abstract: In this work, we investigate the problem of the integer road traffic assignment. So, we model the interaction among the road users sharing the same origin-destination pair, as a symmetric network congestion game. We focus on Rosenthal's results to guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). Then, we study the behaviour of an algorithm based on greedy best response (GBR) in finding PNE. In previous studies, the efficiency of GBR to compute a PNE of a symmetric network congestion game in series-parallel networks is proved. In our work, another approach is used to demonstrate its efficiency in more general networks. It is shown that the non-series parallel networks can be classed into two types. The conditions that make GBR succeeds for each type is then drawn. The advantage of GBR-algorithm is that provides a better approximation of the equilibrate assignment, since it is integer.

Keywords: road traffic assignment; congestion game; Nash equilibrium; GBR algorithm. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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