EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Coordinated decision making on inter-organisational knowledge innovation of project-based supply chain

Guangdong Wu

International Journal of Manufacturing Technology and Management, 2018, vol. 32, issue 2, 124-138

Abstract: Considering the coordinated decision making on inter-organisational knowledge innovation of project-based supply chain, this paper analysed the coordinated decision making on knowledge innovation made between the owner and the contractor based on game theory under three scenarios: Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg game and coordination game. The results showed that under the coordination and cooperation model, both the effort level of the owner and the contractor and the total project value-adding are higher than those under non-cooperative condition. When reasonable allocation plan for residual project value-adding exists, the net profit of the owner and contractor is improved compared with that under non-cooperative game. This paper aims at providing a reliable decision and theoretical direction for project-based supply chain knowledge cooperation innovation, thus to achieve project value-adding.

Keywords: project-based supply chain; knowledge innovation; coordinated decision making. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=90061 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:ijmtma:v:32:y:2018:i:2:p:124-138

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Manufacturing Technology and Management from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:ids:ijmtma:v:32:y:2018:i:2:p:124-138