Non-compete provision: implications for stakeholders of public private partnerships in the energy sector of a developing country

Alex Nduhura, Muhiya Tshombe Lukamba, Thekiso Molokwane and Innocent Nuwagaba

International Journal of Public Policy, 2022, vol. 16, issue 5/6, 311-332

Abstract: Public sector reforms have ushered in public private partnerships (PPPs) as part reforms for transformative governments. To reform public services through PPPs, private partners are attracted to co-production and delivery of services by government incentive frameworks such as non-compete clauses. Since PPP concessions are usually opaque, we searched online for any secondary data on non-compete provisions in PPP agreements. Based on secondary data review, this study reveals that a range of government guarantees are designed, agreed upon and included in concession agreements but remain vulnerable to abuse during implementation by government and its state departments. The breach exposes the government to serious consequences albeit the changes in laws that governments may initiate to salvage the effects of non-compete clauses. The outcome of the study is important since it underscores the need for a win-win flexible approach when managing non-compete clauses in the industry of PPPs.

Keywords: public private partnerships; PPPs; energy; government guarantees; non-compete provision; change in law clause. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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