Central bank independence in practice

Edited by John Cochrane, Adam S. Posen () and David Wilcox ()

No PIIEB25-3 in PIIE Briefings from Peterson Institute for International Economics

Abstract: The Peterson Institute for International Economics held a high-level conference in October 2025 in Washington, DC, to analyze the serious issues concerning central bank independence in practice. The goal was to inform Congress, the federal courts, market participants, and the public with the latest evidence-based assessments of why the independence of the Federal Reserve should be secured and how far it should extend in practical terms. The conference convened leading voices from academia, policymaking, and finance. Their remarks and presentations are brought together in this PIIE Briefing.

Date: Written 2025-12
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