Rationing as a Signal

Jeong-Yoo Kim

International Journal of Business and Economics, 2002, vol. 1, issue 2, 115-122

Abstract: Two consumers sequentially purchase at most one unit of some homogeneous good from a monopolist who knows the state of nature, either high or low. I characterize a rationing equilibrium at which the high-type monopolist produces only one unit and rations customers, whereas the low-type monopolist serves customers by producing two units.

Keywords: rationing; quality; signals; sequential purchases (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 L12 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ijbe.fcu.edu.tw/assets/ijbe/past_issue/No.01-2/pdf/vol_1-2-3.pdf (application/pdf)
https://ijbe.fcu.edu.tw/assets/ijbe/past_issue/No.01-2/abstract/03.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijb:journl:v:1:y:2002:i:2:p:115-122

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Business and Economics is currently edited by Hsiang-Tsai Chiang (Editor-in-Chief), Chiung-Ju Huang (Editor-in-Chief), Feng-Jyh Lin (Associate Editor), Tzu-Ching Weng (Associate Editor), Hsin-Yi Huang (Managing Editor) and Szu-Hsien Ho (Managing Editor)

More articles in International Journal of Business and Economics from School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Szu-Hsien Ho ().