Financial Stability Implications of CBDC

Francesca Carapella, Jin-Wook Chang, Sebastian Infante, Melissa Leistra, Arazi Lubis and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis
Additional contact information
Francesca Carapella: Federal Reserve Board
Jin-Wook Chang: Federal Reserve Board
Sebastian Infante: Federal Reserve Board
Melissa Leistra: Federal Reserve Board
Arazi Lubis: Federal Reserve Board
Alexandros P. Vardoulakis: Federal Reserve Board

International Journal of Central Banking, 2026, vol. 22, issue 3, 337-388

Abstract: A central bank digital currency (CBDC) is a form of digital money that is denominated in the national unit of account, constitutes a direct liability of the central bank, and can be distinguished from other central bank liabilities. We examine the financial stability risks and benefits of issuing a CBDC under different design options. Our analysis is based on lessons derived from historical case studies as well as on an analytical framework that allows us to characterize the mechanisms through which a CBDC can affect financial stability. We further discuss various policy tools that can be employed to mitigate financial stability risks.

Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ijcb.org/journal/v22n3/financial-stability-implications-cbdc (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2026:q:3:a:8

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Central Banking is currently edited by Loretta J. Mester

More articles in International Journal of Central Banking from International Journal of Central Banking
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bank for International Settlements ().