Problemas de Coordinacion y Delay en la Entrada a Acuerdos Avanzados de Integracion

Natalia Pecorari ()
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Natalia Pecorari: CONICET & Universidad Nacional del Sur, Departamento de Economía

Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, 2015, vol. 30, issue 1, 25-40

Abstract: In this paper we model the incentives and coordination problems related to the entry into advanced integration agreements (i.e. Economic and Monetary Union) by applying dynamic coordination games. We assume a set of candidate countries to join the agreement and analyze the coordination failures that prevent the realization of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, which implies that all countries enter in the first period of the game given that no gains from delay exist. We conclude that one way to achieve the secondbest equilibrium, which minimizes delay, requires that a subset of countries cooperate to join the agreement in the first period of the dynamic game, becoming therefore a dominant strategy for the rest to enter a period later.

Keywords: Integration Agreements; Entry Model; Coordination; Game Theory; Cooperation; Delay. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 F02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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