Regulador No Benevolente y Asimetrias de Informacion. Aproximacion con un Modelo de Agencia

Lourdes Marcela Espinoza Vasquez () and Raúl Rubin de Celis Cedro ()
Additional contact information
Lourdes Marcela Espinoza Vasquez: Universidad Católica Boliviana
Raúl Rubin de Celis Cedro: Universidad Católica Boliviana

Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, 2017, vol. 32, issue 1, 23-45

Abstract: This document presents a theoretical model of a non-benevolent regulator and cost heterogeneous operators where the objective function to be maximized, besides considering consumers' and producers' surpluses, includes rent seeking from at least one of the operators that directly benefits the regulator. Under these conditions, the resulting regulatory contract complies with individual rationality and incentive compatibility; however, it introduces distortions that affect the most efficient operators resulting in costs to society as a whole. The main results from this model point towards the need to evaluate the relevance of maintaining regulation under such settings.

Keywords: Benevolent regulator; optimal prices; information asymmetries; incentive compatibility; participation constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 D86 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/542

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ila:anaeco:v:32:y:2017:i:1:p:23-45

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review is currently edited by Carlos Ponce

More articles in Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review from Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mauricio Tejada ().