Strategy-proof multinary group identification

Gopakumar Achuthankutty ()
Additional contact information
Gopakumar Achuthankutty: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: This paper explores the incentive properties of Collective Identity Functions (CIFs) in multinary group identification problems. Building on Cho and Saporiti (2020), we show that one-vote rules (Miller (2008), Cho and Ju (2017)) are manipulable. Additionally, we establish the decomposability of strategy-proof CIFs, enhancing our understanding of their structural properties.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Multinary group identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-des
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2024-006.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2024-006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shamprasad M. Pujar ().