Terminal Ranking Games

Erhan Bayraktar and Yuchong Zhang ()
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Yuchong Zhang: Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5G 1Z5, Canada

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021, vol. 46, issue 4, 1349-1365

Abstract: We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schrödinger bridges we are able to explicitly calculate the equilibrium. This allows us to identify the reward functions which would yield a desired equilibrium and solve several related mechanism design problems. We are also able to identify the effect of reward inequality on the players’ welfare as well as calculate the price of anarchy.

Keywords: Primary: 91A16; secondary: 91B43; 93E20; Primary: games/group decisions: nonatomic; secondary: probability; tournaments; rank-based rewards; mechanism design; mean field games; price of anarchy; Schrödinger bridges; Lorenz order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:46:y:2021:i:4:p:1349-1365

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