The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias–Variance Trade-offs in Data Acquisition

Guocheng Liao (), Yu Su (), Juba Ziani (), Adam Wierman () and Jianwei Huang ()
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Guocheng Liao: School of Software Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai 519082, China
Yu Su: Computing and Mathematical Sciences Department, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125
Juba Ziani: Industrial and Systems Engineering Department, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332
Adam Wierman: Computing and Mathematical Sciences Department, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125
Jianwei Huang: School of Science and Engineering, Shenzhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics for Society, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Shenzhen 518172, China

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024, vol. 49, issue 4, 2749-2767

Abstract: Whereas users claim to be concerned about privacy, often they do little to protect their privacy in their online actions. One prominent explanation for this privacy paradox is that, when an individual shares data, it is not just the individual’s privacy that is compromised; the privacy of other individuals with correlated data is also compromised. This information leakage encourages oversharing of data and significantly impacts the incentives of individuals in online platforms. In this paper, we study the design of mechanisms for data acquisition in settings with information leakage and verifiable data. We design an incentive-compatible mechanism that optimizes the worst case trade-off between bias and variance of the estimation subject to a budget constraint, with which the worst case is over the unknown correlation between costs and data. Additionally, we characterize the structure of the optimal mechanism in closed form and study monotonicity and nonmonotonicity properties of the marketplace.

Keywords: Primary: 91B03; 91B26; Secondary: 68P27; privacy paradox; data correlation; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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