Service Competition and Service War: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Chun-Hung Chiu (), Tsan-Ming Choi (), Yongjian Li () and Lei Xu ()
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Chun-Hung Chiu: Sun Yat-Sen Business School, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, 510275, China
Tsan-Ming Choi: Business Division, Institute of Textiles and Clothing, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Yongjian Li: Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, People's Republic of China
Lei Xu: School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, People's Republic of China

Service Science, 2014, vol. 6, issue 1, 63-76

Abstract: We conduct a game-theoretic analysis on a duopoly pure service game. We consider the situation in which two service providers compete in a market with respect to the service-level decision on a particular common service product. We first construct an analytical model to examine the existence of the Nash equilibrium in the service game. We then prove that the characteristics of equilibrium service levels depend heavily on the prices offered by the service providers. After that, we include service costing and analytically study how it affects the equilibrium service levels under different cases. Finally, we examine the service game under the service war in which one service provider chooses to deviate from the equilibrium service level with the goal of improving market share. Important managerial insights on the first-mover advantage, market share, and service levels under the service war are revealed and discussed.

Keywords: game-theoretic analysis; service competition; service marketing; service game; service war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:orserv:v:6:y:2014:i:1:p:63-76

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