Reducing strategic uncertainty increases group protection in collective risk social dilemmas

Ivo Steimanis (), Natalie Struwe, Julian Benda () and Esther Blanco ()

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck

Abstract: Global crises such as climate change, pandemics, and biodiversity loss present collective risks that require cooperative solutions. This study disentangles selfish behaviors from the uncertainty about cooperation of others as barriers in mitigation of global collective crises. We extend the previous literature by considering that, in many collective risk situations, a part of the population must rely on others for protection. We show that experimentally removing strategic uncertainty leads to 4.5 times more frequent implementation of collective group protection, with 73% less resources wasted, and reduces inequality between providers and beneficiaries within groups by 76%. Moreover, we show that allowing for voluntary transfer payments from those who depend on protection to those who provide it is similarly effective as removing strategic uncertainty by design. These insights enhance our understanding of the fundamental drivers of behavior associated with self-reliance in collective risk dilemmas and offer policy guidance on designing institutions that foster cooperative solutions, ultimately improving social welfare and reducing inequality.

Keywords: Collective risk social dilemma; cooperation; mitigation; adaptation; strategic uncertainty; selfinterest; public good; donation; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D64 D70 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 83
Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2025-02

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