Stability and Anonymity

Karolina Vocke ()

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck

Abstract: In many-to-many matching markets, various concepts have been introduced to analyze stability. Most of these concepts are not straightforward to interpret. For instance, stability blocks may make members of a blocking coalition worse off. This paper argues that the differences between stability concepts stem from different implicit assumptions about anonymity in the market. By explicitly incorporating these anonymity assumptions into the market model, particularly using large markets, it is shown that many differences between stability concepts vanish. In these large markets, stability is a better-behaved solution concept: stability blocks lead to improvements for all members of a blocking coalition, unlike in finite markets. Furthermore, in large markets, an interpretation of each stability concept at the agents’ level can be given explicitly in a natural non-cooperative foundation.

Keywords: matching markets; stability concepts; anonymity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2026-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2026-01

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