If we Confess our Sins

Francisco Silva

No 500, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: I consider the problem a social planner faces in constructing a criminal justice system which addresses two needs: to protect the innocent and to punish the guilty. I characterize the socially optimal criminal justice system under various assumptions with respect to the planner’s ability to commit. In the optimal system, before a criminal investigation is initiated, all members of the community are given the opportunity to confess to having committed the crime in exchange for a smaller than socially optimal punishment, independent of any future evidence. Leniency for confessing agents is efficient because there are informational externalities to each confession.

JEL-codes: D82 K14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:500

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