Transferts monétaires conditionnels: pourquoi la constitution de groupes cibles et leur assujettissement à des conditions pourraient-ils se solder par des échecs?

Guy Standing (ipc@ipc-undp.org)
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Guy Standing: IPC-IG

No 47, One Pager French from International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth

Keywords: Transferts monétaires conditionnels; assujettissement; conditions pourraient-ils; échecs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 2
Date: 2008-08
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Published by UNDP - International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, 2008, pages 1-2

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