Educational Spread as a ‘Coordination Game’ – Theory and Application to Portugal

José Pontes and João Dias

No 2024/0330, Working Papers REM from ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa

Abstract: This paper examines the recent evolution of higher education in Portugal under the light of an n-person coordination game. We feature two alternative coordination requirements, namely “unanimity”, which expresses a cooperative agreement, and “k-coordination”, which is driven by efficiency considerations. We find that public policy has driven higher education to fully cover the territory and in particular individuals living in sparsely populated areas. This orientation might have brought about a loss of scale economies in teaching and, consequently, in the efficiency of tertiary education. This is a plausible explanation for the disconnection between higher education spread and economic growth during the more recent period.

Keywords: Education; Regional Development; Coordination Games; Risk Dominance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 I20 O12 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ise:remwps:wp03302024

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