Interactive Blocking in Arrow-Debreu Economies

Siyang Xiong and Charles Zheng

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Competitive behaviors such as outbidding one's rivals may be countered by the rivals' threat of mutually destructive objections. In an Arrow-Debreu model of production economies with firms privatized by property rights, we model such hindered competitive behaviors as a coalition's attempt to block a status quo given the threat that the outsiders of the coalition, especially those with whom the coalition shares ownership of firms, may resort to production-ruining secession. We introduce new concepts of the core such that a coalition's blocking plan is feasible only if it is not blocked by the outsiders with such secession. Based on such notions, we prove core equivalence theorems in the replication framework.

Keywords: core; coalition; core equivalence; blocking; production; firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-17
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Working Paper: Interactive blocking in Arrow-Debreu economies (2008)
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